The Role of Scientific Discovery in the Establishment of the First Biological Weapons Programmes by Davison, N.
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
refer to the repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from 






Author(s): Davison, N.  
Title: The Role of Scientific Discovery in the Establishment of the First Biological 
Weapons Programmes 
Project: Bradford Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) 
Publication year:  2005 
Science and Technology Report: No. 5 
Publisher: University of Bradford (http://www.brad.ac.uk)  
Publisher’s repository:  http://bradscholars.ac.uk:8080/dspace  
Copyright statement: © 2005 University of Bradford. This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
 






The Role of Scientific Discovery in the 










Department of Peace Studies 
 




 The Role of Scientific Discovery in the Establishment of the First Biological 
Weapons Programmes 
 
By Neil Davison 
 
 
This report addresses the scientific and technological discoveries in the biological 
sciences that enabled the early interest in biological warfare to move from hurling 
infected corpses into enemy cities in ancient times, through use of small cultures of 
animal pathogens to sabotage enemy livestock in World War I, to the origins of organised 
military biological weapons (BW) programmes directed at humans, animals, and plants in 
the inter-war period.  It builds on Dando’s 1999 paper: The Impact of the Development of 
Modern Biology and Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare 
Programs in the Twentieth Century.1  For the historical aspects of biological warfare 
programmes this report primarily draws from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute volume: Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and 
Use from the Middle Ages to 1945.2
 
 
Ancient times and the pre-microbiological era 
 
Prior to the discoveries made in the late 19th century, understanding of the causes of 
infectious diseases was limited.  Three main theories pervaded popular and scientific 
thought over many centuries.  Miasmatic theories emphasised that the ‘poisonous fumes’ 
released from rotting flesh or vegetation and stale water were responsible, whilst the 
theory of contagion suggested that diseases were passed on by person-to-person contact.3  
Theurgic theories related the incidence of disease to notions of good and evil.  Those 
affected were thought to be in receipt of a punishment from God.  It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that early attempts to exploit disease as a weapon were fairly unsophisticated. 
 
Broadly speaking, biological warfare can be defined as the deliberate use of 
microorganisms or toxins to cause illness or death.  Establishing this intent is important 
when looking for early examples of biological warfare in order to distinguish between 
those acts where the aggressors main aim was to spread disease and those where disease 
was merely a secondary consequence.  Wheelis’s study of biological warfare pre-1914 
argues that “… intent is assumed if it is consistent with the state of knowledge of the 
time” but acknowledges the difficulties in determining intent retrospectively.4  An old 
military tactic, dating back to ancient Greek and Roman times, was to place human or 
animal corpses in wells or other sources of drinking water.5  This tactic may have been 
used as a method of spreading disease amongst the enemy and could be deemed one of 
the oldest forms of biological warfare.6  However, the purpose behind such actions may 
have been simply to restrict access to potable water.7  If these actions were biological 
warfare then the miasmatic theory would have supported the use of such crude delivery 
systems. 
 
There are several accounts of the use of potentially infected material in siege warfare 
during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance period.8 It is unclear whether the intent was 
to cause disease but as Wheelis argues, it is “… plausible, since the prevailing theory of 
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 infectious disease in medieval times was that disease was a consequence of the bad air 
resulting from extensive decomposition.”9  Perhaps the most renowned instance occurred 
at Caffa (now Feodosija, Ukraine) in 1346.10  During a siege of the city plague broke out 
amongst the attacking Mongol troops.  Subsequently the Mongols are thought to have 
‘catapulted’ the corpses of infected individuals into the city.11  Plague did emerge 
amongst the inhabitants but there has been some debate as to the method of transmission.  
It has been suggested that it may have been carried into the city via the rodent 
population12 but Wheelis argues that a biological attack was the most likely cause of the 
outbreak.  A plague epidemic (the Black Death) soon flared up in Europe, killing twenty 
million people in the space of three years.13  At the time there were a number of theories 
on the cause of this outbreak.  Some thought it was a punishment from God or the result 
of certain planetary alignments.  The more scientifically minded attributed it to the bad 
air or miasma from decaying organic matter or stagnant water.  Porter notes that some 
people referred to the idea of contagion, 
 
“… but most medical theorists, loyal to their Greek learning, stood by constitutional factors: if the 
body was robust, illness should not result; if not, one would sicken and die.”14
 
If the Mongols recognised the miasmatic theory of disease then they would have likely 
anticipated the transmission of plague through their actions at Caffa. 
 
Two hundred years later there was a significant development in the understanding of 
disease and contagion.  In 1546 Girolamo Fracastoro published a theoretical work 
entitled ‘De contagione et contagiosis morbis curatione’.  He suggested that contagious 
diseases were characterised by the presence of ‘disease seeds’, which could infect by 
contact, by fomites, or from a distance.15  He defined fomites as materials that could 
harbour these seeds16 in some cases for as long as two to three years.17 The notion of 
contagion was thousands of years old but it had been non-specific.  Fracastoro’s work 
was the first clear suggestion of an infectious agent.  His ideas, however, were not 
revisited for several hundred years.18  In the 17th century the field of microscopy began to 
emerge.  One of the first uses of a microscope to study disease was in 1656 when 
Athanasius Kircher used his to study plague victims from an outbreak in Rome and 
reported seeing ‘small worms’.19  In 1665 Robert Hooke published his Micrographia, 
which “… featured the first biological use of the word ‘cell’ in describing the ‘pores’ in 
wood” and Malpighi pioneered microscopic study of the human anatomy.20  However it 
was the Dutchman, Antony van Leeuwenhoek who made the most progress in the late 
17th century, in part due to the quality of his microscopes, which he constructed himself.21  
It was van Leeuwenhoek who was the first to see microorganisms, which he called 
‘animalcules’ or ‘little animals’, thus contributing to the dispute over the theory of 
spontaneous generation.22  However, this discovery, which marks the beginning of 
microbiology, received little attention at the time.23
 
In these early examples of possible biological warfare the intent of the aggressor is 
unclear.  However, in the late 18th century an incident occurred where this intent was 
unquestionable.  During the Indian Wars the English used smallpox as a biological 
weapon against the Native Americans.  Correspondence in July 1763 between the 
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America, Sir Jeffrey Amhurst, and a 
regional commander reveals a plan to transmit smallpox by means of contaminated 
blankets to the Indians who were threatening the British held Fort Pitt.24  Independently, a 
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 month earlier, the commanding officer, Captain Ecuyer, had apparently authorised such 
an ‘attack’.25  Relating a meeting between two Indian Chiefs and British officers, one of 
Ecuyer’s subordinates recorded in his diary on 23 June 1763:  “Out of our regard to them 
we gave them two Blankets and a Handkerchief out of the Small Pox Hospital.  I hope it 
will have the desired effect.”26  Interestingly, as Wheelis notes in his account, the use of 
fomites was an accepted mode of transmission for smallpox.27  Whether these actions 
caused the resulting outbreak is unclear since smallpox epidemics had been occurring 
amongst Native Americans since the Europeans had arrived in the New World 200 years 
before.28  Smallpox and other diseases such as measles and influenza were having a 
devastating effect on the Natives who lacked immunity.29  Miasmatic theories of disease 
were popular at the time but theories of contagion were also discussed especially with 
regard to specific diseases such as syphilis.  In the latter years of the 18th century William 
Cullen, whose work had a great influence on the English speaking world for the next 100 
years, embraced both theories and stated that certain diseases, such as smallpox, could be 
attributed to specific ‘contagions’ whereas others were the result of environmental 
miasma.30
 
There is also evidence that the British attempted to transmit smallpox to the Continental 
Army during the American Revolution.  Two such incidences reportedly occurred in 
Boston and in Quebec in 1775.  The British soldiers are thought to have deliberately 
inoculated some civilians with smallpox, who subsequently acquired a less severe but 
still highly contagious form of the disease, before sending them to mix with Continental 
soldiers.31  It would appear then that both the person-to-person and fomite route of 
transmission was understood at the time. 
 
There were a number of other possible instances of intentional transfer of smallpox to 
Native Americans. 32  One of the later events is thought to have occurred in 1831 on the 
trade route between Saint Louis and Santa Fe, when gifts of smallpox contaminated 
clothing and tobacco were used in an attempt transmit the disease to the Pawnees.33  It is 
interesting because of its timing.  As Wheelis notes, Europeans by that time could benefit 
from vaccination, which had been discovered by Edward Jenner in England in 1798. 
Jenner had heard that previous infection with cowpox in humans somehow conferred 
immunity to smallpox. He experimented by inoculating a young boy with cowpox 
(Vaccinia) and subsequently inoculating him with smallpox.  The boy did not develop 
smallpox and thus the practice of vaccination was established.  Reportedly the technique 
was accepted very quickly and, by 1799, 5,000 people in England had been vaccinated.34
 
Some years later, during the American Civil War (1861-65), there was at least one 
incidence of attempted biological warfare.  Dr. Luke Blackburn, who would later become 
governor of Kentucky, tried to contaminate clothing with smallpox and yellow fever for 
sale to Union troops.35  Although smallpox can be transmitted by fomites it was not 
known at the time that yellow fever is transmitted by mosquitoes.  The ancient practice of 
fouling water supplies with corpses was also employed during this conflict.36  In one 
instance during 1863 in Mississippi the retreating Confederates left animal carcasses in 
wells and ponds to deny Union troops access to water.37  The same year United States 
President Abraham Lincoln issued General Orders 100, which contained one of the first 
legal restrictions applicable to biological warfare.  Article 70 stated that “The use of 
poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from 
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 modern warfare.  He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of 
war.”38
 
During the first half of the 19th century a greater understanding of disease aetiology was 
beginning to emerge, encouraged by challenges to the theory of spontaneous generation.  
In 1835 the idea that a given disease could be caused by a specific ‘agent’ was given 
some credence when Agostino Bassi found that he could cause silkworms to become ill 
by inoculating them with the fungus found on dead silkworms.39  A few years later, in 
1840, Jacob Henle claimed that diseases were caused by a living agent that entered the 
body, acting as a parasite.  This was a challenge to Liebeg’s more popular theories of the 
chemical nature of fermentation and decomposition.40  Soon new discoveries would 
revolutionise the understanding and treatment of disease.  These discoveries would in 
turn have implications for the as yet rare and imprecise science of biological warfare. 
 
 
The ‘germ theory’ of disease 
 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century the immature field of microbiology was 
transformed.  The science of bacteriology emerged through the isolation, culture and 
identification of bacteria.  Specific bacteria were found to be the causative agents of 
numerous human, animal and plant diseases and thus the ‘germ theory’ of disease was 
established.  The early pioneers in this new field of biology were Louis Pasteur in France 
and Robert Koch in Germany.41
 
Pasteur (1822-1895) was originally a chemist but he developed an interest in 
microorganisms and, through appointment as dean of life sciences at the University of 
Lille in 1854, he came to study the process of fermentation.42  Challenging the prevailing 
theory he found that yeast was responsible for alcoholic fermentation and that this was 
therefore a biological process.43  He went on to design intricate experiments to show 
convincingly that microorganisms in the air were the source of the living matter that 
seemed to appear in flasks of ‘broth’, thus dismissing the theory of spontaneous 
generation.44  His work then concentrated on the relationship between microorganisms 
and disease.  In 1866 he found that a specific microorganism was causing a disease in 
silkworms.45  Later, in 1878, he argued for a ‘germ theory’ of infection at the French 
Academy of Medicine.46
 
Inspired by Jenner’s success with smallpox vaccination, Pasteur set to work on the 
mechanisms of disease prevention.  In 1880 he published a paper showing that attenuated 
or weakened microbes that were responsible for chicken cholera could be used to protect 
chickens against infection.47  Later he worked on rabies and managed to produce a 
weakened version of the ‘poison’, or ‘virus’ as he called it, that was responsible for the 
illness, using it to successfully immunise a boy who had been bitten by a rabid dog in 
1885.48  Despite this accomplishment he had been unable to distinguish or isolate the 
causative agent.49  Prior to this work with rabies, Pasteur had used his attenuation 
technique to produce a vaccine for anthrax that he had shown to be effective in animals 
during a public demonstration in 1881.50  His success with anthrax was enabled largely 
due the efforts of Robert Koch, who was simultaneously advancing the understanding of 
microbiology in Germany. 
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In 1876 Koch had published the results of his work with anthrax, showing that a 
bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, was the causative agent of the disease and thus validating 
the ‘germ theory’.51  In 1882 he went on to isolate Mycobacterium tuberculosis, the 
bacterium that causes tuberculosis.52  He soon published his landmark work on the 
aetiology of tuberculosis in which he defined three conditions that had to be fulfilled in 
determining that the tubercle bacillus was responsible for the disease.53  These conditions 
later came to be known as Koch’s Postulates and were used in determining whether a 
specific microorganism was the causative agent of a given disease.54
 
An important aspect of this new science was the isolation and culture of these 
microorganisms.  Koch and his team also led the way in this respect.  It was not possible 
to obtain pure cultures of microorganisms using liquid media and so Koch and his team 
looked to solid media.55  In 1881, building on the work of Schroeter and Brefeld, Koch 
succeeded in using sterile potato slices and then culture media solidified with gelatin as 
solid media that could sustain pure bacterial colonies.56  The following year scientists 
working in his laboratory proposed the use of the algae extract agar-agar instead of 
gelatin because it remained solid at temperatures up to 100 degrees centigrade.57  Several 
years later, in 1887, another of Koch’s colleagues, Julius Petri, developed a new culture 
dish with an overhanging lid, now known as the Petri dish.58
 
The primary outcome of all this work was the identification of the causative agents of 
many human, plant and animal diseases (see Table 1 below).  Porter notes that: 
 
The methods he [Koch] had pioneered proved their worth … leading to the rapid discovery, 
largely by his own pupils, of the micro-organisms responsible for diphtheria, typhoid, pneumonia, 
gonorrhoea, cerebrospinal meningitis, undulant fever, leprosy, plague, tetanus, syphilis, whooping 
cough and various other streptococcal infections.59
 
 
 Table 1:  Discovery of microorganisms responsible for various diseases.60
Date Disease Agent 
1876 Anthrax Bacillus anthracis 
1880 Typhoid Fever Salmonella typhi 
1882 Glanders Pseudomonas mallei 
1883 Cholera Vibrio cholerae 
1887 Malta (undulant) fever Brucella spp. 
1894 Plague Yersinia pestis 
1896 Botulism Clostridium botulinum 
1909 Rocky Mountain spotted fever Rickettsia rickettsii 
1912 Tularaemia Francisella tularensis 
          
Koch and his associates were not alone in identifying new microoganisms.  In 1892 
William Welch and George Nuttall identified Clostridium perfringens as the cause of 
gangrene.61  In 1894 it was Alexandre Yersin in France who was the first to identify 
Yersina (pasteurella) pestis as the causative agent of plague. However, Shibasaburo 
Kitasato, one of Koch’s students, independently observed the plague bacterium that same 
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 year.62  Later, in 1909, the American, Howard Ricketts showed that Rocky Mountain 
spotted fever was caused by a new type of microbe that was subsequently named after 
him, a Rickettsia.63
 
There were other significant developments during this period of rapid discovery in 
microbiology, including work on bacterial toxins.  Following the discovery of 
Corynebacterium diphtheriae to be the cause of diphtheria, in 1884, Friedrich Loeffler 
“… shows that the bacterium secretes a soluble substance that affects organs beyond sites 
where there is physical evidence of the organism.”64  Several years later in France, in 
1888, Emile Roux and Alexandre Yersin show that Corynebacterium diphtheriae exerts 
its effects on tissues and organs by means of a toxin.65
 
An understanding of immunology was also beginning to develop.   In 1884 Ilya 
Metchnikoff had observed phagocytosis and proposed a cellular theory of immunity and 
in 1891 Paul Ehrlich showed that antibodies formed against the plant toxins ricin and 
abrin and put forward the antibody theory of immunity.66  A year earlier Emil von 
Behring and Shibasaburo Kitasato, both working in Koch’s laboratory, were quick to 
make use of the newly identified Corynebacterium diphtheriae.  In 1890 they produced a 
serum antitoxin that could prevent infection with diphtheria in animals.67
 
Importantly the new microbiology was having immediate effects in terms of human 
disease prevention.  Immunisation was mounting an offensive on two fronts.  On the one 
hand employing Pasteur’s attenuated pathogens and on the other using newly developed 
antitoxins.  Pasteur’s rabies vaccine became standard and was used to treat around 20,000 
people worldwide during the decade following its development in 1885.68  Diphtheria 
antitoxin was first used on a child in 1891 and by 1895 had become common practice e, 
made possible by Roux and Yersin’s use of horses for large-scale serum production.69  As 
Porter notes: “In New York, the [diptheria] death rate had peaked at 785 per 100,000 in 
1894; by 1920, it has dipped to under 100.”70  However, other factors, namely better 
hygiene and sanitation, were contributing to a general decline in the number of cases of 
diphtheria.71 The same was true for cholera, which had been proven to be a waterborne 
disease by John Snow in London in 1854.72  It was not until 1883, however, that Koch 
identified Vibrio cholerae as the causative bacterium.73
 
In 1884 one of Koch’s pupils isolated the microorganism responsible for typhoid fever, 
Salmonella typhi.74  The wait was not long for a successful vaccine for typhoid fever, 
which was produced in Britain by Almwroth Wright and David Sample using ‘killed’ 
organisms.75 Due to a debate over its efficacy it was not taken up readily.  Porter notes 
that few British troops received the vaccine during the Boer War when “… in South 
Africa 13,000 men were lost to typhoid as against 8000 battle deaths.”76  The vaccine was 
administered to troops during the First World War, however, and “… whereas in the Boer 
War typhoid incidence was around 10 per cent …, in the Great War incidence was down 
to 2 per cent”.77  Antitoxin for tetanus, which is caused by Clostridium tetani, was 
another successful treatment to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century and to be used 
to great effect during World War I.78
 
There were some diseases for which a treatment was not forthcoming despite the 
isolation of the responsible microorganisms. Treatment of tuberculosis (TB) had a false 
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 start in the early 1890’s after it emerged that Robert Koch’s much-publicised tuberculin 
was not effective.79  It was not until 1924 that the BCG vaccine, developed by Albert 
Calmette and MarieGuerin at the Pasteur institute, was first used in humans to prevent 
TB.80  During the late 1890’s Waldemar Haffkine, a Russian former pupil of Pasteur, 
worked on vaccines for cholera and plague using ‘killed’ organisms but had limited 
success. 81
 
Although the concept of the virus was not fully understood until the mid-twentieth 
century, the field of virology did have its roots in this period.82  In 1892 Dmitri Ivanowski 
demonstrated that the causative agent of tobacco mosaic disease (TMV) passed through 
bacteriological filters.83  Similarly, in 1898, Friedrich Loeffler and Paul Frosch showed 
that the microorganism responsible for foot and mouth disease (FMD) also passed 
through filters designed to retain bacteria.84  The same year Martinus Beijerinck 
described the agent of TMV as a “contagium vivum fluidum”, recognising an infectious 
agent distinct from bacteria.85  Through the work of Walter Reed in the United States, the 
first human disease to be attributed to such a ‘filterable agent’ was yellow fever, which he 
found to be transmitted by mosquitoes.86
 
The emphasis of this frenzy of discovery at the turn of the century was on the 
understanding and treatment of infectious diseases.  However, it appears that other uses 
of this knowledge were not lost on Louis Pasteur.  As early as 1882 he had the idea of 
using a microorganism to cause disease in populations of lice.87  Later he considered this 
strategy for control of rabbit populations in Australasia and he carried out a field test on 
his estate in France, attempting to infect rabbits with Pasteurella multocida.88  Whilst this 
type of biological control would not fall within the contemporary definition of anti-
animal biological warfare it was certainly an indication of things to come.  Wheelis 
points to some other research carried out in Germany and the United States in the early 
1890’s that provides an early example of the dual-use dilemma applicable to defensive 
research.89  This work involved the contamination of bullets with bacteria, such as 
anthrax, and showed, through tests on animals, that the bacteria could survive the blast of 
the firearm and subsequently cause infection of the bullet wound.  Wheelis states that the 
research was most likely carried out to increase understanding of wound infection but 
notes “… the conclusions nevertheless invite application to offensive use”.90
 
At this point in history biological warfare had not emerged as a distinct form of waging 
war.  Early biological weapons would likely have been categorised with poisons and 
chemicals in terms of agents of warfare.  Towards the end of the 19th century the opinion 
of the international community in relation to such weapons was becoming clear.  At the 
Brussels conference in 1874 the ‘International Declaration Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War’ included a section forbidding the use of poison or poisoned weapons, 
although this agreement never entered into force.91  On July 29 1899 at the first 
International Peace Conference in The Hague the ‘Convention with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land’ was signed.  Article 23 stated, “Besides the prohibitions 
provided by special Conventions, it is especially prohibited … To employ poison or 
poisoned arms”.92  This position was reaffirmed at the second International Peace 
Conference at The Hague in 1907.  Despite these agreements, and the additional 
Declaration at the 1899 Peace Conference stating that “The Contracting Powers agree to 
abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
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 deleterious gases”93, chemical weapons were used extensively during World War I.94 It 
was at this time that the first biological weapons programmes emerged, enabled by the 
new understanding of microbes. 
 
 
Biological sabotage programmes in World War I95
 
Germany and France were the first to assemble rudimentary biological weapons 
programmes.  As Wheelis notes, it is possible that the key role scientists from these two 
countries played in the development of microbiology was a factor in this.  Germany ran 
an organised programme of biological sabotage in neutral countries from 1915-1918 
designed to restrict the supply of military livestock to Allied forces during World War I.  
The German programme was controlled by the General Staff of the Army and had no 
civilian oversight.  The anti-animal operations made use of cultures of Pseudomonas 
mallei (glanders) and Bacillus anthracis (anthrax).  These microorganisms had been 
identified for the first time in 1882 and 1876 respectively.  Clandestine operations were 
conducted in the United States, Romania, Spain, Norway, Argentina, and also on the 
Western Front.  Despite two requests during 1916, the German leadership ruled out the 
use of microorganisms against humans for moral and technical reasons. 
 
The most extensive operations were carried out in the United States before they entered 
the War. During this period the US shipped horses and mules, which were of significant 
tactical importance, to France and the UK.  In April 1915, on an assignment for the 
German General Staff, Dr. Anton Dilger, a physician who was born in the United States 
to German parents, brought cultures of glanders and anthrax from Germany to the United 
States and subsequently set up a ‘laboratory’ in the basement of a private house in the 
Chevy Chase region of Maryland, not far Northwest of Washington D.C..  He and his 
brother cultured the bacteria on solid media before creating liquid suspensions.  This 
technique would not have been unfamiliar to physicians at the time.  These suspensions 
were used in attempts to infect horses and mules awaiting shipment near the ports of New 
York, Baltimore, Norfolk and Newport News.  Animals were pricked with needles 
protruding from the glass vials in which the bacterial suspensions were carried.  Another 
delivery method was the addition of the bacteria to food and water supplies.   The modes 
of transmission for these two diseases were understood and these delivery mechanisms 
could have lead to infection.  The sabotage operations in the United States are thought to 
have begun in the summer of 1915 and ended in the autumn of 1916. 
 
A similar operation to infect horses in Romania also involved the use of glanders and 
anthrax to infect horses and cattle respectively.  Sabotage was also carried out in Spain 
against both horses and cattle and is thought to have continued late into the War.  In 
Norway reindeer were the focus of the Germans attention because they were used by the 
British to transport arms to Russia.  In late 1916 attempts were made to infect reindeer 
using sugar cubes containing capillary tubes filled with anthrax culture.  Some of these 
sugar cubes survived having been acquired by the Norwegian police at the time.  These 
museum pieces were analysed in 1998 by scientists who found that they still contained 
viable Bacillus anthracis organisms.96  This delivery system was also used in German 




The Germans carried out some anti-animal sabotage activities on the Western Front 
including an attempt in 1917 to infect French horses with glanders by ‘brushing’ the 
cultures on their noses but these operations were discontinued due to the capture of 
agents.  A number of other allegations were made against the Germans including an 
attempt by an agent to spread plague in St. Petersberg in 1915, the reported infection of 
4,500 mules with glanders in Mesopotamia in 1917, and the dropping of fruit, chocolate, 
and children’s toys contaminated with bacteria in Bucharest.97  However, like many 
allegations of biological warfare, their reliability is questionable.  The uncovering of 
some German sabotage operations may have encouraged other countries to investigate 
this method of waging war. The French set up a similar programme of biological 
sabotage although on a much smaller scale.  The Germans believed that French agents 
were infecting horses in Switzerland with glanders and there are reports of biological 
material being discovered in the possession of French prisoners of war.  The British also 
addressed the possibility of biological warfare but concluded that it was infeasible. 
 
Wheelis argues that the German programme was notable since it was both the first 
national biological weapons programme and the first to have a scientific basis.  In 
retrospect it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the sabotage activities especially 
given the natural outbreaks of glanders amongst livestock.98  Over 58,000 horses used by 
the French Army are thought to have contracted glanders through natural causes during 
World War I.99
 
By 1918, having learned of the German biological weapons programme, the United 
States conducted its first research in the field.100  Investigators looked at two ways in 
which the toxin ricin, which is extracted from castor beans, could be delivered as a 
weapon: they found that it could be adhered to shrapnel bullets and would maintain its 
toxicity after detonation; and they also looked into creating ricin ‘clouds’ for airborne 
delivery.101   These delivery mechanisms were tested in the laboratory but they did not 
produce an operational weapon before the end of the war.102
 
Since the German sabotage activities consisted of covert operations on a small scale, it is 
not surprising that they only produced small quantities of agents.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the fermentation technology enabling large-scale culture of bacteria was 
available at the time.  In 1915 Chaim Weizmann discovered and isolated Clostridium 
acetobutylicum and found that it could be used to produce acetone and butyl alcohol.103  
Acetone for the production of explosives was in short supply at the time and the large-
scale fermentation of Clostridium acetobutylicum became an important part of the British 
War effort.104
 
Regardless of developments in biological warfare, the world soon received a chilling 
reminder of the power of naturally occurring disease outbreaks.  Recent scientific 
advances were humbled by the ‘Spanish’ influenza pandemic (1918-19), which swept 




Selected developments in the biological sciences in the inter-war period 
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Advances and discoveries in the field of microbiology continued apace with particular 
attention to new therapies.  As the result of work begun in 1906, Calmette and Guerin in 
France demonstrated a vaccine against tuberculosis using a live non-virulent strain of the 
bacteria.106  The Bacillus Calmette Guerin (BCG) vaccine was first used on calves but the 
First World War delayed its introduction to humans until 1924. By 1928 it had been used 
to immunize 116,000 French children but there seems to have been controversy over its 
efficacy and other countries including Germany and the USA did not initially approve the 
vaccine whilst its introduction in the UK was delayed.  The BCG vaccine played a major 
part in a Europe-wide vaccination campaign by the Danish Red Cross in the aftermath of 
World War II.107  In 1938 Theller’s yellow fever vaccine was successfully tested and by 
1947 The Rockefeller Foundation in the USA had produced over 28 million doses.108
 
Although certain diseases had been attributed to ‘filterable agents’, it was not until 1926 
that virology was launched as a distinct field when Rivers presented a paper 
distinguishing between bacteria and viruses.109  It was known that viruses could not be 
cultured in the same way as bacteria since they required their host organism or host cells 
and so there was a search to develop alternative means of cultivation aside from the 
inoculation of live animals and plants.110  In the early 1930s scientists developed the 
technique of growing viruses in chicken eggs, a method that is still used today despite the 
subsequent emergence of cell culture methods in the 1950s, whereby mammalian cells 
are removed from the animal and grown in a culture medium to support viral growth.111  
The study of viruses was severely limited initially by the inability to see them through 
existing microscopes.  This changed with the invention of the electron microscope in the 
1930s allowing the first pictures of a virus to be taken in 1940112 and a subsequent 
acceleration in the understanding of viruses during the 1940s and 1950s.  In 1945 Luria 
and Hershey showed that viruses mutate making it difficult to develop immunity to 
them.113
 
Treatment of illness with natural or synthetic chemical compounds did not become 
organised until the nineteenth century when the scientific study of drugs resulted in the 
new field of pharmacology.114  In the 1890s Erlich had been the first to use a systematic 
approach, following on from discoveries in microbiology and his own work on antigen-
antibody interactions, to attempt development of chemical therapies for newly discovered 
infectious diseases.  Building on the long history of use of mercury and arsenical 
compounds from the dye industry, Erlich synthesised hundreds of arsenical compounds 
and patented one, Salvarsan, which by 1910 had been used to treat 10,000 syphilis 
sufferers.  This was succeeded by a modified version, Neo-Salvarsan or 
neoarsphenamine.  Although effective these compounds were still toxic and further 
advances were not forthcoming until 1935 with the use of Protonsil.115  Protonsil, another 
chemical from the dye industry, was introduced to medicine by a German, Gerhard 
Domagk, who demonstrated that it was effective for treating streptococcal infections.  
Later sulphanilamide was shown to be the active compound produced when Protonsil was 
hydrolysed in the body.  It worked by preventing bacterial growth thus enabling the 
immune system to overcome the infection rather than killing the bacteria themselves.  In 
1938 a British team of scientists developed a similar compound called M&B 693 
(sulfadiazine), which was also effective against pneumococcal infections and more 
effective than Protonsil against streptococci.  It was used to treat Winston Churchill’s 
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 pneumonia during World War II.116  As Porter notes in his historical study of medicine, 
such drugs soon became very popular: “These new ‘sulpha drugs’ began to be prescribed 
in vast quantities: by 1941, 1700 tons were given to ten million Americans.”117
 
In 1929 Alexander Fleming published a paper describing the anti-bacterial effect of an 
extract of the Penicillium mould, penicillin, on gram positive bacteria.118  However, since 
penicillin had no effect on gram negative bacteria, and it was difficult to isolate, Fleming 
did not take this work further.119  It was not until 1940 that Ernest Chain and Howard 
Florey, having reviewed the scientific literature for antibacterial substances and 
discovered Fleming’s paper on penicillin, used the substance to cure streptococcal 
infections in experimental mice.120  However the same year, in an early indication of 
antibiotic resistance in bacteria, Chain and Abraham discovered a substance produced by 
E. Coli that could inactivate penicillin.121  In 1941 penicillin was first tested on a human 
volunteer and shown to be non-toxic.122  One of Florey’s colleagues Norman Heatley, 
collaborating with American scientists in Illinois in 1941, worked to improve techniques 
for penicillin production and subsequently three US companies started large scale 
production of the drug.  British companies followed suit in 1943 and by mid-1944, as 
Porter describes, “enough was available to allow unlimited treatment of allied 
servicemen.”123  Porter goes on to note: 
 
Penicillin proved hightly effective against most types of pus-forming cocci, and against the 
pneumococcus, gonococcus, meningococcus and diptheria bacillus, the bacilli of anthrax and 
tetanus and syphilis.  Pre-penicillin, the pneumonia fatality rate was around 30 per cent; it dropped 
to around 6 per cent, and pneumonia, once the old man’s friend, ceased to be a major source of 
death.124
 
In 1940 Waksman and Woodruff had isolated actinomycin from an actinomycete fungus, 
which led to the discovery of many other antibiotics from that group of fungi.125  
Actinomycin, although antibacterial, was toxic in humans and not used clinically.126 In 
1944, however, Walksman isolated streptomycin from a related fungal species and found 
that it had an anti-bacterial affect on gram negative bacteria similar to penicillin’s effect 
on gram positive organisms.  It was soon used to treat tuberculosis.127  
 
Another significant area of biology with its roots in this period is molecular genetics.  In 
1928 Griffith discovered bacterial transformation.  However, the mechanism behind this 
process, by which bacteria can take up and express foreign genetic material, was not 
elucidated until the early 1940s when Avery, MacLeod and McCarty showed that DNA 
was the transforming material.128
 
 
First generation biological weapons programmes 
 
Whilst the boundaries of the field of microbiology continued to be pushed forward it was 
during the inter-war period (1919-1938) that the new body of knowledge, having 
emerged at the turn of the century, was assessed by militaries in a more organised and 
wide ranging fashion, beyond the realm of the limited biological sabotage activities that 
occurred in World War I.  France, Japan, and the USSR were the first to establish 
organised programmes incorporating offensive and defensive preparations although 
making distinctions between the two types of research would be difficult from the outset.  
 12
 Germany’s efforts were fairly limited due to Hitler’s ban on offensive research, which is 
most ironic since perceptions about Germany’s “extensive” activities in this area were a 
major driver for the development of the French programme and later other allied 
programmes.  These initial biological weapons programmes are known as ‘first 
generation’, making use of the new bacteriology, simple culture methods, and crude 
delivery systems.  The programmes of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United 
States are considered to be ‘second generation’ programmes due to their increased level 
of sophistication.  The offensive aspects of these programmes were not initiated until 
after the start of World War II and so they will not be covered here apart from a brief 
description of the developing interest in the field of biological warfare in these countries 
during this period. 
 
An important development during this period was the signing in 1925 of the Protocol for 
The Prohibition of The Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods Of Warfare, known as the Geneva Protocol.129  Thus the 
prohibition of use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare became part of 
international law.  However, the Protocol did not prohibit research and development and 
was essentially seen as a ‘no first use’ agreement as expressed in the reservations given 
by some signatories.  It had originally been focused on chemical weapons due to the 
events of World War I but the Polish delegation called for the inclusion of 
‘bacteriological’ weapons in the agreement.  The Protocol, which came into force in 
1928, increased awareness about the issue of biological weapons amongst many 
countries.  In Japan it was seen as confirmation of the utility of such weapons, which 




Interest in biological weapons by the French Government moved beyond crude sabotage 
methods in the early 1920s when Andre Trillat, Director of the Naval Chemical Research 
Laboratory, was requested to produce a report evaluating the military potential of 
biological warfare.  The Trillat report, completed in 1922, emphasised intelligence on 
German biological weapons research activities giving impetus to the idea of a French 
biological programme.  According to Lepick’s study of the French programme, Trillat 
viewed biological weapons as distinct from chemical weapons with different military 
uses, having delayed effects and to be used at long range.  He had been studying aerial 
transmission of diseases for a number of years previously and had published in this area 
from 1918-20.  He argued that the most effective way to deliver this type of weapon was 
in the form of a microbial ‘cloud’ of fine droplets.  Agents he considered viable included 
plague, cholera, influenza, typhoid, dysentery, glanders, foot and mouth disease, and 
particularly brucellosis because of its hardiness and ease of culture. 
 
A Bacteriological Commission was set up in December 1922 and met first in 1923.  It 
drew on the expertise of leading microbiologists including the Director of the Pasteur 
Institute, Emile Roux, and his Deputy Director, Albert Calmette, one half of the team that 
developing the BCG vaccine at the time.  A veterinarian at the meeting commented on his 
preparation of infectious biological material for use in sabotage activities against horses 
during World War I.  The commission thought that aerial bombs producing microbial 
clouds would be the best delivery systems.  Research on biological weapons was to be 
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 funded at military as well as civilian laboratories, including the Pasteur Institute.  In 1923 
dissemination experiments on animals with paratyphoid (salmonella) and cholera were 
carried out by the military research laboratories including an open-air test.  Further work 
in 1923 and 1924 focussed on practical issues such as methods for maintaining the 
virulence of pathogens (e.g. varnishing the inside of bombs).  From 1925-26 the focus of 
research was on delivery systems:  
 
The aim was to develop a device whose burst on ground impact would have the effect of 
producing clouds consisting of very small droplets containing fragmented microorganisms with 
the capability, despite their fragmentation, of producing pathogenic effects.132
 
In October such aerial bombs were successfully tested at a naval firing range. 
 
From 1927-34, research was limited due to a commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
which the French ratified in May 1926 although they reserved the right to retaliate in 
kind.  Lepick notes that the Bacteriological Commission did not meet a second time until 
1935 and that this initial work on biological weapons was characterised by the ‘individual 
dedication’ of some scientists rather than ‘firm political will’. 
 
The reinvigoration of the biological programme through the second meeting of the 
Bacteriological Commission in 1935 was apparently related to deterioration in Franco-
German relations.  Press allegations about German tests at disseminating bacteria on 
underground train systems in London, New York and Paris spurred the French to conduct 
their own experiments on the Paris Metro.  At this time there were also experiments 
conducted on Clostridium botulinum resulting in botulinum toxin being added to the list 
of suitable weapons agents.  During 1936-37 Trillat’s research focussed on production of 
aerosols and also on defensive measures (e.g. antiseptic clouds).  In 1937 the Prophylaxis 
laboratory was established to further offensive work in the BW area given tensions with 
Germany.  The Prophylaxis Commission (the renamed Bacteriological Commission) met 
twice in 1938 and discussed work on ricin as a weapon, vaccines and serum to protect 
against ricin, botulinum toxin dispersal studies, the Paris metro tests, and concerns over 
German use of ricin to poison water supplies.  
 
Again spurred on by reports of German activities in this area, a report presented to the 
Commission argued that pathogens, most effective in the form of aerosols, should be 
studied on the basis of their virulence, viability, and serious disease causing potential.  
Research and testing was expanded in 1939 and early 1940, focussing a variety of areas 
including: ricin aerosols; animal diseases such as bovine plague; dispersion issues; 
contaminating projectiles with tetanus, gangrene, or anthrax; combining chemical and 
biological agents; and finally tests of bovine plague-filled munitions on guinea pigs.  This 
research encompassed offensive and defensive considerations.  By early 1940 the 
Secretary of the Prophylaxis commission had stated, in a presentation at a meeting 
focussing on the issue of defence against biological weapons, that spreading diseases 
(such as anthrax, tetanus and gas gangrene) using bursting projectiles or spraying from 
aircraft was feasible and that contamination of food, water, or medicine supplies with 
biological agents (such typhoid, cholera, dysentery, botulinum toxin, and ricin) was also 
possible.  The biological weapons programme was suspended in 1940 after defeat by 
Germany although it is thought that some activities continued secretly until Germany 





Despite German biological sabotage operations during World War I, Geissler’s study of 
their activities in this area during this later period notes that “… German biological 
warfare activities were sporadic, incomplete and largely unsupported by the 
leadership.”134  Interest in the 1920s apparently arose from concerns over French and 
Soviet considerations of biological weapons as well as negotiations of the Geneva 
Protocol, which Germany ratified unconditionally in 1925.  In the same year Richard 
Otto at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin and Max Reinmer reviewed potential weapons 
agents and Otto noted that the bacterial agents causing typhoid, paratyphoid fever, 
dysentery, cholera, plague, glanders, anthrax, and wound infections were the most 
suitable.  They recommended delivery by production of aerosols or contamination of 
drinking water.  However during the 1920s and 1930s the focus in Germany was on 
chemical weapons and there was scepticism and disagreement over the utility of 
biological weapons.  Initially biological research activities were incorporated into 
existing chemical weapons research organisations but in 1940 the first BW laboratories 
were established. One of the main drivers for German work on biological weapons during 
World War II was intelligence and perceptions of the activities of Canada, France, UK, 
USA, and the USSR.  A leading bacteriologist, Henrich Kliewe, evaluated the French 
programme significant data from which were uncovered after the German defeat of 
France in 1940 and was thereby convinced that biological warfare was viable.  In 1942, 
however, Hilter prohibited all biological weapons activities apart from defensive 
research. 
 
Geissler notes that, although many facilities were involved in biological weapons 
research activities under this defensive mandate, activities were limited and few scientists 
were involved in biological weapons work.  The Kliewe Laboratory conducted small-
scale work on the combined use of chemical and biological agents and studies on 
survivability of bacteria including anthrax.  Elsewhere there was work on: production of 
plague vaccine; dissemination of agents by aircraft; dissemination of plague using insect 
vectors; research and vaccine development on foot and mouth disease; vaccines for 
plague and yellow fever; and sera for anthrax, botulism and tularaemia.  Kliewe carried 
out experiments on aerosols and reported on various other possible dissemination 
methods including glass containers.  Field-tests with the non-pathogenic bacteria as 
simulants were conducted as well as experiments with aerial spraying of foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) virus. 
 
Despite the German sabotage activities of World War I, no such activities were 
conducted during World War II since Hitler’s ban also extended to this type of biological 
warfare.  However there were numerous proposals from those interested in the utility of 
biological weapons for use of contaminated foods and other products.  Other proposals 
centred on the use of biological agents to contaminate water supplies.  Although some 
offensive research and development was conducted under the cover of defensive 
activities, Geissler argues that the German activities during this period were disorganised, 





The Japanese biological weapons programme was by far the largest programme during 
this period and certainly the most ruthless.  It is estimated to have involved over 10,000 
personnel.   Harris describes the main characteristics of the programme as follows: 
 
The main features of the Japanese biological warfare programme were the unique emphasis on 
offensive weapons and the willingness to use them against China and the USSR.  However, the 
programme was also spurred by defensive concerns and the belief that China and the Soviet Union 
were engaging in biological sabotage against Japanese forces…136
 
The impetus for the establishment of the Japanese BW programme came from an army 
doctor, Ishii Shiro, whose developed an interest in biological weapons in the mid-to-late 
1920s and lobbied his military superiors to establish a programme.  Having been 
appointed Professor of Immunology at Tokyo Army Medical School in 1930 he gained 
support from Koizumi Chikahiko, a leading military scientist, to set up a biological 
weapons research laboratory, which remained the headquarters of the programme until 
1945.   
 
Harris points out that Ishii repeatedly classified biological weapons research into two 
distinct categories: defensive vaccine research which he called ‘B-type’ research and 
offensive ‘assault’ research involving human experimentation which he called ‘A-type’ 
research.  The latter was to be conducted outside Japan and so Ishii set up a laboratory in 
Harbin in the Chinese region of Manchuria.  He staffed it with a unit of 300 men, known 
as The Togo Unit under the ultimate control of the Army General Staff.  This site proved 
unsuitable for the human experimentation he intended to carry out since it was a large 
town and so the Harbin site was used for defensive research.  Soon after, in mid-1932 
they built another facility consisting of 100 buildings on the site of a village called 
Beiyinhe (100km south of Harbin).  This facility was called Zong Ma Prison Camp and 
contained a large building in the centre where prisoners were held (between 500 and 600 
at a time).  Here they conducted experiments on the prisoners, infecting them with a 
variety of pathogens and analysing their blood.  They focussed their efforts on anthrax, 
glanders and plague.  In 1935 the facility was closed and Ishii set about his search for an 
even larger site.   
 
The construction of a new facility at Ping Fan nearby started in 1936 and was completed 
in 1939.  It was very heavily financed and consisted of over 150 buildings as well as a 
private airstrip and railway link.  The operation, which was renamed Unit 731 in 1941, 
recruited hundreds of civilian as well military scientists, although they were aware of the 
nature of human experimentation being carried out.  Prisoners were injected with a 
variety of pathogens, made to eat contaminated food and liquids, and exposed to 
prototype biological bombs and shells exploded at various distances. Thousands of 
people were killed, with some having been dissected whilst still alive.  Hundreds of 
kilograms, of the pathogens responsible for plague, anthrax, typhoid, cholera, and 
dysentery were produced at Ping Fan using culture equipment developed by Ishii in the 
early 1930s that, according to Harris, enabled “automatic planting and scratching 
operations.”137  Large quantities of agents were also produced by Unit 100, which was 
established in 1936 also in China, and mainly focussed on anti-plant and anti-animal 
biological weapons research.   
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In addition there was considerable work carried out to develop vaccines and sera.  20 
million doses of vaccine were produced per year at Ping Fan with additional doses 
produced at other facilities in China.  Harris notes that “Ping Fan utilized 50 000 hens 
and roosters annually to produce the fertilized eggs required for the preparation of the 
typhus vaccine…”.138  Unit 731 also conducted vaccine research and development in 
cooperation with various universities and colleges.  Plague vaccine was developed at the 
Kitasato Institute, typhus vaccine was developed at Manchuria Medical College by a 
professor who was later to become commander of Unit 731, and other vaccine work on 
gas gangrene, tetanus, anthrax, cholera, dysentery and typhoid was carried out at Tokyo 
University. 
 
Unit 731 and Unit Ei 1644, which was established in 1939 at a hospital in Nanking and 
employed around 1500 people, carried out experiments on humans to the establish the 
ID50 (Infectious dose necessary to infect 50% of those exposed) for anthrax, cholera, 
dysentery, epidemic haemorrhagic fever, gas gangrene, glanders, influenza, paratyphoid, 
plague, tuberculosis, tularaemia, typhoid, and undulant fever (brucellosis).  Unit 100 
studied anthrax and glanders and there were limited efforts to study toxins such as 
tetrodotoxin.  Anthrax and plague were considered the most suitable biological weapons 
agents because of their high mortality.  Artillery shells, aerial bombs and aircraft spraying 
were the three methods considered for agent delivery.  By 1940 the Japanese programme 
had developed nine different biological bombs, large numbers of which were used in tests 
on humans at a test site in Anda, however none proved satisfactory according to Ishii’s 
testimony after World War II.  Shells filled with bacterial suspension and an explosive 
charge also proved ineffective.   
 
In 1939 Ishii was given permission to carry out field tests that involved spreading 
quantities of the pathogens responsible for salmonella and typhoid along the shoreline at 
the border of Manchuria and the USSR.  2000 biological shells were delivered to the 
front lines and were fired against Soviet troops during battles in the summer of 1939. As 
Harris notes their effectiveness is unclear: 
 
Many Japanese and Soviet soldiers were felled by cholera, dysentery and plague.  It remains uncertain, 
however, whether the casualties were caused by biological warfare, or perhaps more likely, by the 
primitive sanitary conditions in the area.139
 
From late 1939 to late 1942 Ishii coordinated extensive field tests in Manchuria and other 
areas of China.  These involved sabotage of wells, release of plague infected rats, and 
scattering of plague infected fleas and contaminated cotton and grain.  Aside from 
plague, other material used included the causative agents of cholera, salmonella, typhoid, 
anthrax, typhus, paratyphus, and glanders.  Although epidemics occurred, affecting 
Japanese as well as Chinese troops, the effectiveness of these tests remains unclear.  
Ishii’s successor, Kitano Masaji, preferred laboratory work on human subjects and so 
field tests were curtailed after 1942. 
 
Although the size of the Japanese programme was unprecedented it did not produce an 
effective biological weapon system before the close of the programme at the end of the 
Second World War.  Harris argues that this was mainly due to organisational 
deficiencies:   
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The Japanese biological warfare programme was uncoordinated, often amateurish and highly 
compartmentalized.  There was no inter-service coordination, and within the programme secrecy 





The USSR’s Military Chemical Agency (MCA) was established in 1925 with 
responsibility for chemical and biological weapons.  Its director, Jacov Fishman, 
produced a report in 1928 stating the feasibility of biological warfare based upon initial 
experimental work with anthrax and botulinum toxin.  He argued that biological weapons 
could be used for sabotage and for battlefield operations using biological shells and 
bombs. This research at the MCA included work to increase the virulence and stability of 
anthrax, which was considered a suitable warfare agent, and dispersal tests with this 
agent.  Botulinum toxin was considered more applicable to sabotage.  He proposed an 
organisational structure encompassing the MCA responsible for offensive research, the 
Institute of Chemical Defence for defensive research, and the Ministry of Health for 
vaccines and prophylaxis.  As Bojtzov and Geissler describe in their study of the 
programme: 
 
The ministries of Health and Education became involved in BW research.  They became the main base 
for coordinating, executing, controlling and distributing military requests concerning biological 
warfare. … The entire effort was managed by the MCA and controlled and coordinated by the Ministry 
of Defence.142
 
Existing research institutes such as the Moscow Institute of Epidemiology and 
Microbiology, and the Charkov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology provided a 
source of expertise and facilities.  A small research laboratory in Moscow established in 
1926 carried out the orginial experiments on Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus 
anthracis discussed in Fishman’s report.  Other research efforts were distributed amongst 
medical and university laboratories.    Facilities in the Leningrad area included: the 
Zlatogrov-Maslokovich Laboratory and the Bacteriological Institute in Leningrad.  In and 
around Moscow were: the Scientific Research Institute of the Red Army working on 
protection against infectious diseases, the Scientific Research Institute of Health carrying 
out BW research for the Army, the Moscow Chemical-Pharmaceutical Institute, and the 
Saratov Institute for Microbiology and Epidemiology.   
 
Bojtzov and Geissler note that the programme involved the study of a variety of agents:  
 
The MCA decided to prioritise research into the agents of: anthrax, brucellosis, encephalitis, 
glanders, plague, tuberculosis and tularaemia.  Agents studied in the MCA laboratories and 
subsequently tested in field tests were Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum, Yersinia pestis, 
Vibrio comma asiaticae, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and the agents of cholera, glanders, tetanus, 
tularaemia and typhoid fever.  
 
Testing grounds used for biological weapons experiments included Tomka, which was 
primarily a chemical weapons testing area, and two islands, Gorodomlia in Lake Seliger 
and Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea.  On Gorodomila dissemination tests were conducted 
and the Velikonovski Institute on the island evaluated anthrax, cholera, glanders and 
typhoid.  The Public Health Institute of Dnepropetrovsk University conducted other 
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 experiments there with plague and tularaemia, including dissemination of ‘clouds’ of the 
tularaemia bacillus.  In 1935, tests with foot and mouth disease, leprosy and plague were 
carried out on the island by the Moscow Institute of Foot and Mouth Disease. Large-scale 
field tests were conducted on Vozrozhdeniye island including, in 1937, aircraft drops of 
containers filled with the causative agents of cholera, leprosy, plague, and tularaemia. 
 
Bojtzov and Geissler’s study discusses the negative effects of the The Great Terror of the 
late 1930’s on the Soviet biological weapons programme.  During Stalin’s ‘purges’ 
dozens of leading microbiologists were executed or imprisoned, included Jacov Fishman, 
the originator of the programme, who was not released until 1954.  
 
Reports about biological weapons research and development in other countries, 
particularly Germany, led to increased Soviet activity in this area during World War II.  
There were accusations of Soviet biological sabotage activities during 1942 and 43.  The 
USSR also had concerns over biological sabotage directed against it and considerable 
attention was given to the production of vaccines against anthrax, plague, brucellosis, and 
tularaemia although their purpose may have been use against natural outbreaks of 
disease. 
 
Bojtzov and Geissler conclude that in the period before the end of the Second World 
War: 
 
… there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union was interested in biological warfare, carried out 
numerous test experiments, was sensitive regarding the BW programmes of other nations, was fully 
aware of the sabotage potentialities of these weapons and may indeed have used them in certain limited 
operations.143
 
They go on to say that the Soviet Union considered biological weapons as feasible 
militarily but it is unclear whether they had integrated BW capability into military 




Further to reports of biological sabotage activities during World War I, intelligence 
reports during the 1920s and 1930s indicated that other countries such as Italy and the 
USSR were pursuing biological weapons.  Increased interest in biological weapons was 
also due to the agreement of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 prohibiting the use of 
poisonous gas and ‘bacteriological’ weapons in warfare, which the UK ratified in 1930.  
However it was ‘revelations’ brought forward by Henry Wickham Steed in 1934 relating 
to German biological weapons research and development including tests on the Paris 
Metro and London Underground that led the UK to investigate the field.  Maurice 
Hankey, then Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, contacted three eminent 
scientists through the Medical Research Council (MRC): John Ledingham, Director of 
the Lister Institute; William Whiteman Carlton Topley, Professor of Bacteriology at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; and Stewart Rankin Douglas, Deputy 
Director of the National Institute for Medical Research at the MRC.  They assessed the 
information in the documents obtained by Wickham Steed.  The scientists were cautious 
about the contents but they did point out the vulnerability of the underground system to 
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 such attacks.  Subsequently, as Carter and Pearson write in their study of the UK 
programme: 
 
In November 1936 the Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee was set up by the Minister for the 
Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskipp, to ‘report on the practicability of the introduction 
of bacteriological warfare and to make recommendations as to the countermeasures which should 




Canada signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925 and waited to ratify it until the UK ratified it 
in 1930 but there was little interest in biological weapons until the publication of 
Wickham Steed’s revelations about German activities in 1934.  More serious 
consideration of BW began in 1937 when Fredrick Banting, a leading defence scientist, 
prepared a report for Andrew McNaughton, President of the National Research Council 
(NRC), discussing the threat from biological warfare waged with various agents and 
methods of dissemination.  As Avery discusses in his study of the Canadian programme, 
Banting pressed McNaughton on this issue again in 1938 and during a mission to the UK 
to meet British experts, McNaughton requested him to prepare a detailed report on the 
biological weapons threat which emphasised the need for defensive measures and a 
retaliatory capability which he presented in January 1940.  Banting received little support 
for his appraisal when he returned to Canada but eventually persuaded the Canadian 
Minister of Defence Colonel Ralston to allow him to proceed with limited biological 
weapons experiments on delivery systems and suitable agents amongst other relevant 




The United States signed and promoted the Geneva Protocol but the senate did not ratify 
it at the time.   In the inter-war period the US military was sceptical about the feasibility 
and utility of biological weapons although they were of course aware of Wickham 
Steed’s allegations about German activities.  As Van Courtland Moon’s study of the US 
programme notes: 
 
A September 1939 conference between CWS [Chemical Warfare Service] officers and members 
of the Surgeon General’s Office and US Public Health Service condluded that the immediate 
threat to the USA was minimal although further consultations on biological warfare should be held 
between the participants and other concerned agencies. 
 
With the advance of World War II, and intelligence reports indicating that Japan and 
Germany considered biological warfare to be feasible, attitudes changed and in 1941 a 
meeting was held between the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the Surgeon General’s 
Office and the War Plans Division of the General Staff to allocate responsibilities for 





As events during World War I illustrate, it did not take long for the revolutionary 
discoveries and advances in bacteriology from the late 1800s and early 1900s to be 
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 incorporated into military operations.  The German biological sabotage programme 
against livestock made use of bacterial agents that had only been identified for the first 
time some 30 to 40 years previously.  Their operations required only small quantities of 
agent and so simple culture methods were used.  Interest in the feasibility of biological 
warfare expanded in the inter-war and early World War II periods with the development 
of a number of offensive programmes including a Japanese effort involving a huge 
number of people and resources as well as thousands of victims of human 
experimentation.  The desire to develop these weapons was influenced by the imminent 
conflict (World War II) and misperceptions, from intelligence or other reports, about 
biological warfare preparations underway in other countries.  This led to an initial arms 
race that intensified during World War II.   
 
All this was made possible by civilian advances in the biological sciences, particularly in 
the field of bacteriology, which provided an understanding of the causative agents of 
numerous diseases from which the majority of weapons agents were selected.  Militaries 
made full use of the expertise in the civil sector with the same minds applied both to the 
development of offensive weapons and to defences against them. With the exception of 
the Japanese programme, these early efforts were at the research and development stage 
and so did not employ the emerging industrial equipment for large-scale fermentation.  In 
Japan they improvised using basic culture methods and adding elements of automation in 
order to produce hundreds of kilograms of agent.  Aside from contaminating food, water 
or other materials for sabotage, the dissemination of airborne ‘clouds’ of bacteria 
‘sprayed’ from bombs, artillery shells or other containers was considered the best route 
for delivering biological weapons agents.  However, the science of aerial transmission of 
disease, or more broadly aerobiology, was in its infancy and so effective delivery systems 
were elusive even in the vast Japanese programme. 
 
The timing of two major conflicts may have catalysed the process of applying the new 
bacteriology for military purposes but the fact remains:  Following some of the greatest 
advances in the history of infectious disease prevention and treatment, this new science 
was soon applied for nefarious purposes.   
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